Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Utah v. Bryant : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ryan Tenney; Assistant Attorney General .
Mr Kenneth L Combs .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bryant, No. 20090107 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1500

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
Appeal No. 20090107
MARC CLIFTON BRYANT,
Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT SENTENCE
RESTITUTION JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ENTERED
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
O 0O

MR. KENNETH L. COMBS, Bar # 7486
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-C
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0100
Facsimile; (435) 674-0530
Ryan Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
ORAL ARGUMENTS/ PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 3 0 2011

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Appellee,

]

v.

]

MARC CLIFTON BRYANT,

)
]

Appellant.

Appeal No. 20090107

]

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT SENTENCE
RESTITUTION JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT ENTERED
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR WASHINGTON
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
0O0

MR. KENNETH L. COMBS, Bar # 7486
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-C
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0100
Facsimile: (435) 674-0530
Ryan Tenney
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
ORAL ARGUMENTS/ PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii
ARGUMENT
1
I.
BRYANT'S SENTENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
1
H.
EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL THE
MERGER OF SUCH CHARGES SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED
BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT CROSS APPEAL SUCH ISSUE
3
HI. BRYANT'S FD7TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
BECAUSE HE WAS CONVICTED BY THE JURY OF BOTH
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING AND CHILD ABUSE WHEN
ELEMENTS OF CHILD ABUSE WERE CONTAINED IN THE
AGGRAVATED KTONAPPING CHARGE THUS CONSTITUTING
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
6
TV. INVITED ERROR DID NOT OCCUR WITH REGARDS TO THE
LESSER INCLUDED JURY INSTRUCTION
9
V.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION REGARDING THE USE OF THE WORD
"COHABITATION."
11
VI. CHRISTIANSEN WAS INEFFECTIVE AND BRYANT
RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS REMAND UNDER RULE 23B . . . . 16
CONCLUSION
18

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Caselaw
Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)
Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056,23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)
In re Adoption R.B.F.S.. 2011 UT 46
InreWinship. 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)
Halladavv.Cluff739 P.2d 643(Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1, (Utah App.1989)
Kimball v. Kimball. 2009 UT App. 233,217 P.3d 733
Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co.. 517 A.2d 1056 (Del.Supr.1986)
State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996)
State v. Arbon. 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App 1996)
State v. Coble 2010 UT App 98, 232 P.3d 538
State v. Davis. 903 P.2d 940 (Utah App 1995)
State v. Eagle Book. Inc.. 583 P.2d 73 (Utah 1978)
State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, (Utah Ct.App.1998)
State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, (Utah App.1995)
State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291,(Utah 1986)
State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677(Utah 1986)
State v. Kerr. 2010 UT App 50,228 P.3d 1255
State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33 (1980)
State v. Lopez. 2004 UT App 410,103 P.3d 153
State v. Low. 2008 UT 58, 192 P.3d 867
State v. St. Clair. 282 P.2d 323, (Utah, 1955)
State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, (Utah 1996)
State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546(Utah 1987)
State v. Vigil. 840 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
State v. Wagstaff 772 P.2d 987(Utah.Ct.App.l989)
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127(D.C.Cir.l969)
Wells v. Commonweath. 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1978)
West Vallev City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct.App.1991)
White v. Maryland. 100 Md.App. 639 A.2d 194, 199 (Ct.Spec.App. 1994)
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS:
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V

Page
16
4
13,15
10
3, 5
12,15
11,13
3
16
4
3,5
4
9, 10
7
13, 15
9
16
6, 8
9
7, 8
6
9,10
3
10
17
16
. . . 16
16
10
12
7, 8
3,5,6

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII

2

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV
UTAH CONST. ART. I §7

16
2
2

UT. R. APP. P. 23b(a)

17
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS (CONTINUED):

UT.R.APP. P. 24(a)(9)
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3)
UTAHCODEANN. §76-5-404.1(h)
UTAHCODE ANN. §76-3-405(1)
UTAHCODEANN. §76-3-405(2)

PAGE

1
7
12
4,5
4, 5

OTHER:

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota,
1991, p. 178

iii

12,14

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Appellee,

]

v.

]
I

MARC CLIFTON BRYANT,
Appellant.

Appeal No. 20090107

;
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

BRYANT'S SENTENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

In its Brief, the State wrongfully asserts that Bryant argues that his sentence to life
without parole for aggravated kidnapping "was excessive punishment because he did not kill
her." Brief of Appellee at p. 19. This is a woefully inaccurate misinterpretation of Bryant's
position on this matter. Bryant argues that (1) his due process rights were violated; (2) the
use of the definition "serious bodily injury" (which was not even contained in the statute
applicable at the time) was incorrectly used which led to this erroneous sentence; and (3) the
punishment, was too harsh for the crime that he was found to have committed. See Opening
Brief pp. 26-30. Thus, the State has misconstrued Bryant's argument, although the State
concedes that Bryant should be resentenced. It is the State's position that, because the statute

upon which his sentence is based was not in affect at the time he committed the crime,
Bryant's sentence was unconstitutional. See Brief of Appellee at p. 32.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV and UTAH CONST. ART. I §7 indicate that a defendant shall
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Bryant's opening
brief clearly challenges that he was denied Due Process by the State's failure to provide
adequate notice that they intended to seek a sentence of Life without the possibility of parole,
thereby failing to provide Bryant his fundamental right to defend against such request.
Bryant further challenges in his opening brief that the definition of "serious bodily injury"
was used to enhance his sentence although such definition does not appear in the statute upon
which he was sentenced.

Such sentence was excessive for the crime for which he was

convicted, violating his rights under the U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.
Bryant's opening brief did take the position that the sentence of Life without the
possibility of parole should be reserved for more severe crimes, but such argument was
clearly misconstrued by the State. While Bryant's positions respecting the violation of his
Due Process rights and the excessiveness of the sentence differ from the State's position that
the sentence was unlawful based on the trial court's misapplication of the current statutory
scheme, both parties agree that the sentencing determination should be overturned as
unconstitutional. This Court should thus reverse the trial court's determination at sentencing
and remand the matter for re-sentencing in accordance with this Court's positions on the
issues raised in this appeal.
D.

EVEN THOUGH THE SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL THE
2

MERGER OF SUCH CHARGES SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED
BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT CROSS APPEAL SUCH ISSUE
In Appellee's Brief the State argues that, because the Bryant was erroneously
sentenced on the kidnapping charge and because the element of "serious bodily injury" did
not apply, the trial court's articulated determination respecting the merger on the charge of
child abuse should be reversed. The State argues that Bryant should be sentenced on the
child abuse charge in addition to be resentenced on the kidnapping charge. Brief of Appellee
at p. 29. The State's argument is not properly before this Court and is meritless regardless.
In Halladav v. Cluffit states that, "[t]he decision whether to cross appeal is simple...
[i]f a respondent wishes to modify or vary the trial court's judgment, he must cross appeal."
Ibid, 739 P.2d 643,645 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), referencing Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517
A.2d 1056,1060 (Del.Supr.1986). In addition, State v. Coble further addresses why crossappeals are necessary, stating as follows:
[Litigants must] cross-appeal or cross-petition if they wish to attack a
judgment of a lower court for the purpose of enlarging their own rights or
lessening the rights of their opponent... Nor should a party be allowed to
employ its adversary's appeal or petition as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit
than that granted below.
Ibid, 2010 UT App 98, &10, 232 P.3d 538 (emphasis added), quoting State v. South, 924
P.2d 354, 355-57 (Utah 1996).
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V states that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." "This mandate extends to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment... and forbids, among other things, multiple punishments imposed
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in separate proceedings for the same offense." State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App
1996), citinz Benton v. Maryland. 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056,2062,23 L.Ed.2d 707
(1969), State v.Davis, 903 P.2d 940,943 (Utah App 1995). This concept is partly embodied
under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-405(1), which states as follows:
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a difference offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied.
There are only two (2) exceptions to the rule articulated in §76-3-405(1), to wit: (a) when the
increased sentence is based on facts not known to the court at the time of the original
sentencing and such facts are placed on the record; or (b) when a defendant enters into a plea
agreement with the prosecution and later successfully invalidates the conviction placing the
parties back in their original position. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-405(2).
In the case at hand, the trial court found that the child abuse charge should be merged
into the aggravated kidnapping charge because they contain the same elements, thus resulting
in a combined sentence. In the State's concession that the kidnapping sentence was
unconstitutional, it now seeks to have the merger determination overturned and the child
abuse conviction reinstated, which would authorize the trial court to sentence Bryant on both
charges on remand from this appeal. However, the State failed to properly exercise its right
to appeal such issue.
The State did not raise this issue on cross appeal and cannot seek to modify or vary the
court's judgment without having done so. Cluffat p. 645. The State cannot now challenge
4

the conviction to lessen the rights of Bryant. Coble & 10. A violation of rights is necessarily
a lessening of rights if there was no violation existing previously.
The State seeks to violate Bryant's rights against Double Jeopardy by obtaining a
harsher sentence on the child abuse charge than was previously afforded in the merger by the
trial court below. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-405(1) forbids a trial court on remand to render
"a new sentence for the same offense or for a difference offense based on the same conduct
which is more severe than the prior sentence ..." Ibid. Authorizing the trial court to render a
sentence on the child abuse charge that was merged into the aggravated kidnapping would
result in a harsher sentence on the child abuse charge. Additionally, authorizing a sentence
on the child abuse charge would erroneously authorize a sentence on a different offense, the
conduct of which was already encompassed in the aggravated kidnapping charge. None of
the exceptions contained in §76-3-405(2) apply in this matter, hence a violation of UTAH
CODE ANN.

§76-3-405(1) would result in a double jeopardy violation. U.S. CONST. AMEND.

V.
The issue of merging the child abuse and aggravated kidnapping convictions was not
properly raised by cross appeal by the State, hence this Court lacks jurisdiction to address it
on appeal. Should this Court determine to address the issue nonetheless, adoption of the
State's position would necessarily result in a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-405( 1) and
Bryant's rights against being subjected to double jeopardy under U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
Thus, this Court should either decline to reach the merits on the fact that the issue is not

5

properly before this Court, or deny the State's erroneously requested relief in protection of
Bryant's constitutional rights.
HL

BRYANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
BECAUSE HE WAS CONVICTED BY THE JURY OF BOTH
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING AND CHILD ABUSE WHEN
ELEMENTS OF CHILD ABUSE WERE CONTAINED IN THE
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CHARGE THUS CONSTITUTING
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

In its Appellee's Brief, the State argues that Bryant was not subjected to double
jeopardy on the child abuse and kidnapping charges because they were not the same offense.
The State further argues that, since felony child abuse requires a lesser showing of serious
physical injury, it should be charged separately. These arguments are flawed at their
inception, because the same elements are included in both the kidnapping charge and the
child abuse charge, subjecting Bryant to double jeopardy in the trial court's conviction of
both. Bryant's Fifth Amendment rights were thus violated.
As addressed in State v. Kerr, double jeopardy protects a defendant from multiple
punishments for the same offense and states that, "double jeopardy 'protects a defendant
from (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.'"
Ibid., 2010 UT App 50, FN. 1, 228 P.3d 1255, citing State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,1[51, 192
P.3d 867. Kerr states further as follows, "lesser-included offenses are 'those where the two
crimes are such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed
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the lesser.'" See, State v. Finlavson, 956 P.2d 283, 287 (Utah Ct.App.1998). In State v.
Lopez it states as follows:
When charges merge, "[i]t is not the case that the defendant is not guilty of the
lesser offense; it is rather the case that he is guilty of those lesser offenses but
simply is not to be twice punished." White v. Maryland, 100 Md.App. 1, 639
A.2d 194, 199 (Ct.Spec.App.1994).
Ibid, 2004 UTApp 410, f4,103 P.3d 153,155. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3) also affirms
that "[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense."
In the case at issue, the trial court found that the conviction of child abuse was a lesser
included offense to aggravating kidnapping. Thus, the Court articulated after conviction that
it was merging the child abuse conviction into the aggravated kidnapping charge to prevent
subjecting Bryant to double jeopardy. Although Bryant was only sentenced on the
aggravated kidnapping charge, the child abuse charge was still presented to the jury. This is
significant since he was convicted of both charges by the jury, thus leading to a tainted jury
as addressed more particularly in Bryant's opening brief.
As is argued supra, for this Court to address the merger specifically articulated as a
finding of the trial court and subject Bryant to sentencing on both the aggravated kidnapping
and child abuse convictions, the State was required to cross appeal. They failed to do so.
For this Court to implement such request on remand would violate Bryant's rights and
erroneously subject him to double jeopardy.

7

The State's argument is further flawed as it argues that felony child abuse only
requires a lesser showing of "serious physical injury" and thus should be charged separately
because it does not require the same showing as aggravated kidnapping. Allowing this
argument to prevail would be to adopt a concept that anyone charged with a crime could also
be charged with all of the lesser included offenses solely based upon a lesser burden of proof
accompanying the lesser offenses. This Court's precedent dictates that this procedure cannot
exist in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment protections. "It is not the case that the
defendant is not guilty of the lesser offense; it is rather the case that he is guilty of those
lesser offenses but simply is not to be twice punished." Lopez at f4, citing White at 199.
As is stated above in Kerr, an individual cannot be charged for the same crime under
different statutes without being subjected to double jeopardy. For the crimes of child abuse
and aggravated kidnapping to be sentenced separately, the elements of each must be
statutorily different. However, the crime of aggravated kidnapping contains the elements
found in the statute regarding child abuse, evidencing that child abuse is a lesser included
offense of the kidnapping conviction.
While the trial court was correct in merging the convictions in sentencing Bryant, the
error had already occurred by submitting both charges to the jury and obtaining a conviction
on both charges from the jury. In the jury's minds they were faced with determining
convictions on multiple crimes when it should have only been one, with the other as a lesser
included offense if requested. There is no possible way to quantify the prejudice existing in
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the taint on the jury in this matter. Thus the double jeopardy violation in submitting both
charges to the jury as separate charges was prejudicial and should be reversed and remanded.
IV.

INVITED ERROR DID NOT OCCUR WITH REGARDS TO THE
LESSER INCLUDED JURY INSTRUCTION.

In its brief the State argues that Bryant invited the error by failing to object to the set
ofjury instructions which omitted the definition of "adult cohabitation." Brief of Appellee at
p. 43. However, the issue is not one subject to invited error through failure to object, but
rather the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the requisite element of the
crime.
In State v. St. Clair it states as follows:
It was not the prerogative of counsel, but the exclusive responsibility of the
court to instruct thejury. Jurors are persons of ordinary intelligence-often of a
higher degree than courts and lawyers give them credit. They are properly
always directed, as they were here, that they must follow the instructions of the
court as to what the law is, regardless of what they personally believe it is, or
ought to be. Conscientious jurors are usually anxious to abide by the directions
and desires of the court, so far as made known to them, and sometimes do so
even against what might seem to them to be common sense.
Ibid., 282 P.2d 323,329, (Utah, 1955)(emphasis added). "Clearly, the court does have a duty
to instruct the jury on the statutory elements of a crime." State v. Eagle Book, Inc., 583 P.2d
73,75 (Utah 1978). When "the jury [is] not instructed concerning the elements of the crime
of which [an individual] is convicted, [this Court] is unable to determine whether the jury
properly found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant is
therefore entitled to a new trial." State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 291 (Utah 1986), citing
State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (1980). A violation of due process occurs when proof beyond a
9

reasonable doubt is not assured on each element. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 at fii. 53
(Utah 1987), citing Wells v. Commonweath, 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1978). "[T]he Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)(emphasis
added).
In the instant matter it was not the job of Bryant's trial counsel to properly instruct the
jury on the term of "adult cohabitant," since such term was charged as an element of the
convictions as committed by a person in the position of special trust. The trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on all elements of the crime as charged by the prosecution, which is
a duty exclusively belonging to the courts. Eagle Book at 75; St. Clair at 329. The trial court
should have ensured that the element of special trust regarding an "adult cohabitant" was
properly explained to the jury as outlined in Bryant's opening brief.
This omission by the trial court could not be properly addressed through any objection
by counsel. Such omission effectuated a violation of Bryant's Due Process rights because the
jury was not given all the proper instructions regarding the elements of the crime from which
they could make their decisions, thus undermining their verdict of guilt based in proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. This violation cannot be tolerated simply because Bryant's trial
counsel did not object or indicate that a jury instruction was missing.
It was difficult for Bryant to object to an instruction that was never presented. The
trial court was responsible to correctly instruct the jury regarding all the elements of the
10

crimes charged, and it failed in this responsibility by not instructing the jury on the element
of an "adult cohabitant" when the State charged the crime as it did. Therefore, it was not
invited error but rather the trial court's failure in its responsibility to properly instruct the jury
that led to the jury not being properly instructed regarding the element of an "adult
cohabitant." Having effectuated a violation of Bryant's Due Process rights thereby, the
conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded for correction of the egregious error.
V.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION REGARDING THE USE OF THE WORD
"COHABITATION."

In its brief, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to support the claim the
Bobbie's mother and Bryant were cohabitating, additionally arguing that Bryant has failed to
marshal the evidence regarding this claim. Brief of Appellee at p. 46. This argument is
incorrect.
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states in pertinent part that, "[a] party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." In
Kimball v. Kimball this Court recently revisited the marshaling requirement and determined
the following concerning its prior holdings on the subject:
... [T]he marshaling doctrine, now recognized in our rules, see UTAH R. APP. P.
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding."), requires that counsel identify
which particular findings are challenged as lacking adequate evidentiary
support and then show the court why that is so. This can only logically be done
by summarizing, or "marshaling," whatever evidence there is that supports
each challenged finding. We emphasize that only the supportive evidence is
legally relevant and is all that counsel should call our attention to. See Neely v.
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, fl2, 51 P.3d 724 ("[A]n exhaustive or
11

voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial, even if this
recitation includes within its body the facts that support the challenged
ruling, is not what is expected."), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
Ibid., 2009 UT App. 233, fh. 5,217 P.3d 733 (emphasis added). Hence, this Court clarified
that, "[i]f there is some supportive evidence, once that evidence is marshaled it is the
challenger's burden to show the 'fatal flaw' in that supportive evidence... and explain why
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding." Id. citing West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311. 1315 (Utah Ct.App.199n.
In Black's Law Dictionary, "cohabitation" is defined as, "to live together as husband
and wife, the mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are
usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual
relations." Ibid, 6th Edition, West Publishing, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1991, p. 178. Under
Utah law, an improper jury instruction is grounds for "reversible error 'if it tends to mislead
the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party.'" Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp..
774 P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1989). Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines "roommate"
as, "one of two or more persons sharing the same room or living quarters."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§76-5-404.1(h) defines a person in a position of special trust as

follows:
(h) the offense was committed by a person who occupied a position of special
trust in relation to the victim; "position of special trust" means that position
occupied by a person in a position of authority, who, by reason of that position
is able to exercise undue influence over the victim, and includes, but is not
limited to, a youth leader or recreational leader who is an adult, adult athletic
manager, adult coach, teacher, counselor, religious leader, doctor, employer,
foster parent, baby-sitter, adult scout leader, natural parent, stepparent, adoptive
12

parent, legal guardian, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or adult cohabitant of a parent.
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, in In re Adoption R.B.F.S. the Utah Supreme Court
discussed legislative intent as follows:
To discern legislative intent, we begin by looking to the plain language of a
statute. As part of our plain language analysis, we read the language of the
statute "as a whole" and also in "relation to other statutes." In so doing, we
"read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning''' We also
"assume that each term included in the [statute] was used advisedly" and seek
to give effect to "every word, clause and sentence... if such can be reasonably
done.
Ibid, 2011 UT 46, f 12, - P . 3 d - (emphasis added). Furthermore, "entice" or "enticement" is
defined as follows:
Black's Law Dictionary defines "entice" as "to wrongfully solicit, persuade,
procure, allure, attract, draw by blandishment, coax or seduce. To lure, induce,
tempt, incite, or persuade a person to do a thing." Black's Law Dictionary 531
(6th ed. 1990). This definition is consistent with the statutory purpose in that it
describes the use of improper psychological manipulation to influence the will
of another. In other words, the "enticement" of a teenager by an adult occurs
when the adult uses psychological manipulation to instill improper sexual
desires which would not otherwise have occurred.
State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App.1995).
In the instant matter, Bryant cited to all of the evidence regarding his living in the
same house to show how his living with Bobbie's mother did not amount to "cohabitation."
Under Kimball the marshaling requirement indicates that a party need only identify the
particular finding that was challenged and show the court why such finding lacks evidence.
It further continues on to say that counsel only needs show the supportive evidence to its
position and this is all the court's attention should be draw to, an exhaustive or voluminous
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recitation of all the evidence is not necessary. Id. at fh. 5. Bryant did just this by providing
this Court with all the evidence supporting that he was not a cohabitant with Bobbie's
mother. Thus, he has not failed to marshal such evidence. The State has failed to indicate
what evidence it believes Bryant overlooked in his marshaling to support its position.
Based upon the definition of "cohabitation" as is defined in Black's Law Dictionary
the definition of "cohabitant" or "cohabitation" does not apply to those who simply reside
together in the same resident, but have separate rooms. If this application were adopted, then
anyone who lived in a separate apartment within an apartment complex could be called a
"cohabitant." The definition of cohabitant is very clear that such relationship is one that
requires the parties to live together as husband and wife and assume those rights, duties, and
obligations. Black's Law Dictionary at p. 178. The definition of "roommate" is simply more
than one person who shares a room or living quarters. It makes no mention of any other kind
of obligations, duties, or rights. "Roommate" more appropriately defines the kind of
relationship that Bryant had with Bobbie's mother; however, the crime for which he was
convicted required more.
The enhancement of the charges with regards to a person who is in a position of
special trust with the victim does not apply in a situation where the person is only a
roommate and not an actual cohabitant. Bryant resided in the same household, but did not
maintain the ability to control or influence the actions of the other family residing there. The
term "cohabitant" has never been defined to mean a parent's roommate, and thus is not
applicable to this matter.
14

The enhancement should not have occurred and is sufficiently undermined. The
legislature did not intend for the term to be defined this way and the Supreme Court in
R.F.B.S. indicates it looks at the ordinary and accepted meaning of each word in interpreting
a statute. The ordinary and accepted meaning of "cohabitant" does not fit the relationship
herein, thus Bryant's sentence should not have been enhanced.
Furthermore, the State's theory that it presented an alternative theory of enticement
fails. The evidence presented below was catered towards the position of special trust. The
evidence presented did not support that psychological manipulation was utilized, particularly
to instill improper sexual desires that would not have otherwise occurred. Gibson at p. 356.
This standard was not addressed, thus, the argument of the State regarding enticement fails.
An improper jury instruction is grounds for "reversible error 'if it tends to mislead the
jury to the prejudice of the complaining party.'" Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.,
774P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1989). Bryant did not "cohabitate" with Bobbie's mother and thus
was in no position of special trust. His sentence should not have been enhanced. Bryant
sufficiently marshaled the evidence to enable this Court to meet the merits of the issue;
however, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Bryant and Bobbie's mother were
"cohabitants" for trial court to enhance his sentence.
VI.

CHRISTIANSEN
WAS
INEFFECTIVE
AND
BRYANT
RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS REMAND UNDER RULE 23B.1
Bryant was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in this criminal matter below.

1

This argument is submitted on reply pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87
S.Ct. 1396,18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) on review by Bryant and at his request.
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. Bryant believes that his representation by Mr. Christiansen below
warrants reversal and remand for a new trial. Christiansen represented Bryant in Bryant's
absence. The Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows:
Any waiver of the right to be present "must be voluntary and involve an
intentional relinquishment of a known right." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987,
990 (Utah.Ct.App.1989). However, "[i]f [defendant's] absence is deliberate
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence." Id. (citations
omitted). To intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must
have notice of the proceedings. United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127,
1130 (D.C.Cir.1969). In addition, his absence must be voluntary in the sense
that he is free to attend, not incarcerated elsewhere. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d
677, 678 (Utah 1986).
State v.Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah 1996). During the time of trial in this matter,
Bryant was not incarcerated elsewhere, but was released on an ankle bracelet and capable of
being located and attending. Christiansen's representation at not procuring Bryant's
attendance through proper notification fell below the objectively reasonable standard of
representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,104 S. Ct. 2052,2064, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984)("As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.")
Additionally, Christiansen had previously provided his original record to Bryant
mistakenly believing that Bryant was no longer eligible for public defense representation;
however, it was later acknowledged that Bryant continued to remain eligible. Christiansen
never received the file back from Bryant prior to representing him at the trial in which Bryant
was not present. "... [L]ack of preparation and investigation of a case constitutes ineffective
assistance where defendant can prove he was thereby prejudiced..." State v. Vigil 840 P.2d
16

788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Christiansen was unable to adequately prepare and present a
sufficient defense on Bryant's behalf without his original file and without Bryant's presence.
Support for these allegations of ineffectiveness do not appear in the record on appeal
as it pertained to interactions between Bryant and his counsel, Christiansen. UT. R. APP. P.
23B(a) requires that a motion brought thereunder be filed prior to the filing of appellant's
opening brief, but does allow upon a showing of good cause for this Court to allow a belated
request. Bryant respectfully requests remand for a determination of the allegations of
ineffectiveness contained herein as it pertains to his counsel proceeding with the trial in his
absence and his counsel's failure to adequately prepare without access to his file.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Bryant respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Judgment in this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems
necessary.
DATED this

day of

, 2011.

Kenneth L. Combs
Attorney for Marc Clifton Bryant
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